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Overview: Business model innovation has arguably become a critical way to innovate, 
but its success factors are poorly understood. A lack of tools allowing the examination of 
business models in their entirety combined with the complex relationship between 
business model changes and market outcomes makes this especially difficult. This article 
introduces a comprehensive framework that addresses these two issues, by providing an 
integrated, value-based view of all of the critical components of the business model. 
Comparing this framework with Osterwalder's Business Model Canvas highlights its 
benefits in considering business model innovation. Finally, the framework is applied to 
two well-known cases—Netflix and Spotify—to demonstrate how the tool can be used to 
highlight the critical differences in business models that may at first seem very similar 
and show how the framework enables managers to envisage the dynamics of business 
model innovation. 
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 Long gone are the days when breakthrough technological innovation was considered the 
primary driver of competitiveness. Increasingly, innovative business models—the 
mechanisms for capturing value from technological innovation—are allowing less 
technologically advanced firms to displace powerful incumbents. In particular, increasing 
digitization across many industries has rendered old pricing and revenue models obsolete 
and demanded entirely new ways of capturing value. As a result, even the most 
traditional industries have experienced disruption as a result of business model 
innovation.  
While it only seemed logical that industries relying heavily on digital technologies (such 
as the telecom, video game, music, and movie industries) would be highly disrupted and 
struggle to find a new sustainable business model, many were surprised to see traditional 
industries, such as hotels or taxis, radically reshuffled by the advent of new business 
models. In most cases, these disruptive business model innovations did not come from 
companies already operating in the market, but from outsiders, such as Apple (music), 
Netflix (movies), Rovio (video games), Airbnb (hotels), and Uber (taxis). The prevalence 
of these kinds of disruptions have convinced most companies of the need for business 
model innovation, not only to stay ahead of existing competitors but also to anticipate the 
emergence of new ones.  
However, this kind of business model innovation, necessary as it is to maintain 
competitive advantage, remains difficult in practice. Many companies simply do not 
know where to start. The complexity of business model innovation is exacerbated by a 
lack of common language—there are many representations of what a business model 
actually is, each with its own elements and definitions—and a lack of universally 
applicable tools. Widely adopted frameworks, such as Osterwalder and Pigneur’s 
Business Model Canvas, while generally adequate to represent potential business models, 
may not be the best tool to support business model innovation.  
We seek to address this gap by presenting a 360° business model framework, one that 
represents all aspects of a business model from a value perspective. Such a framework 
can offer a comprehensive view that can help direct attention to where business model 
innovation might have the most impact. In conjunction with other well-known tools, it 
can also help direct the execution of business model innovation. 
Business Model or Business Models? 
Given the increasing interest in business model innovation, it is not surprising that the 
concept has become ubiquitous over the past decade. It is used by both academics and 
practitioners, and it would be hard to find a startup that has not made a “revolutionary” 
(or “disruptive”) business model the crux of its elevator pitch. However, in spite of the 
growing consensus around the critical importance of understanding business models and 
business model innovation, there is little agreement about what a business model actually 
is, or how it might be innovated  (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger 2013). 
A number of frameworks and tools are available, each relying on its own underlying 
notion of what a business model is. Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur 2010) has been widely adopted by practitioners, who value its clear and 
 concise presentation. Osterwalder’s Canvas consists of 9 key elements that address the 
value proposition as well as the activities and relationships required to support it. These 
elements are presented in a single-page graphical format, which makes it easy to survey 
and practical to complete. However, although the Canvas is a good general-purpose tool 
for describing business models, it does not address some key drivers of business model 
innovation associated with value creation, capture, and delivery. 
Academic researchers, on the other hand, face a more complex landscape. Partly because 
each study has a different focus, researchers often consider only some aspects of business 
models (typically value creation and value capture), while leaving out others that are not 
relevant to their work but are nonetheless essential. There is also a lack of consensus in 
academic literature around the primary components of a business model; for instance, in 
some studies, value networks are considered a primary component of the business model 
alongside value creation and value capture (Koen, Bertels and Elsum 2011), while others 
regard them as a part of value creation (Abdelkafi, Makhotin, and Posselt 2013). Finally, 
there is occasionally some confusion over some of the components; for instance, as 
discussed in Makadok and Coff (2002), the term “value creation” is sometimes used to 
describe aspects of business models that are in fact related to value capture, such as the 
revenue models.  
The lack of consensus around the specific components constituting a business model, and 
the consequent lack of a precise representation of an archetypal business model, 
underlays a lack of common understanding of what business model innovation precisely 
is (Teece 2010). This gap is widened by the complex nature of business models and 
business model innovation, and their interaction with markets. Sometimes, a small 
change in a particular business model component can create competitive advantage and 
positive market outcomes, or lead to failure. Elsewhere, a combination of barely 
perceptible changes across the business model will make a company stand out from the 
competition.  
This complexity gives urgency to the need for a framework that encompasses all the 
components of a business model and gives a comprehensive view of the possible business 
model innovations and their likely outcomes. Such a 360° view is intended to provide an 
effective tool to reflect upon, plan, and implement business model innovation. 
Towards a 360° Business Model Framework 
Although there is little consensus on the various elements that constitute a business 
model, some key components are mentioned more often than not:  
• Value creation,  
• Value proposition,  
• Value capture,  
• Value delivery, and 
• Value communication.  
 Value creation—the mechanism by which goods and services acquire value that can then 
be captured and shared—is one of the most important elements of a business model (Zott 
and Amit 2002; Chesbrough 2007; Abdelkafi, Makhotin, and Posselt 2013). Value 
creation derives from core competencies, key resources, governance, complementary 
assets, and value networks. Firms create value by combining core competencies with key 
resources (preferably in new ways). Governance—how resources and competencies are 
managed—can also greatly affect value creation (for instance, by improving 
productivity). Complementary assets, such as complementary products and services, 
business alliances and partnerships, customer base and reputation, are critical elements in 
the success of a firm, as Teece (1986) notes; the lack of such assets has led to the failure 
of many firms, despite technological advantages. Consequently, complementary assets 
are a critical driver of value creation. Value networks, which consist of upstream 
(suppliers) and downstream (distributors, end users) relationships, are just as critical and 
arguably increasingly so. In recent years, firms have turned to co-creation and 
crowdsourcing to widen their value networks; collaborative arrangements and 
engagement with customers can increase access to complementary assets.  
The value proposition—the mechanism through which the value created is offered to the 
market—is another central element of the business model (Chesbrough 2010; Teece 
2010, 2011). The value proposition specifies what is offered (the product or service) and 
at what price (the pricing model). It must be both sustainable for the firm and suitable to 
the market. Business model innovation often proceeds through changes in the value 
proposition, for instance by introducing a “freemium” pricing model or moving from 
product to service offerings through servitization.  
Value delivery describes how the value created is delivered to customers (target market 
segments) through distribution channels (Osterwalder, Pigneur, and Tucci 2005; 
Abdelkafi, Makhotin, and Posselt 2013; Holm, Günzel, and Ulhøi 2013). These elements 
offer ample opportunity for business model innovation, by addressing the needs of a 
neglected market segment (for instance, low-cost airlines that target budget travelers) or 
by introducing a new way to deliver products or services (for instance, moving to Internet 
delivery or 3D printing).  
Value capture refers to the ability of a firm to benefit from the value created 
(Chesbrough 2007; Holm, Günzel, and Ulhøi 2013). Thus, it includes the revenue model 
used to generate cash flow as well as the cost structure. Value capture also includes profit 
allocation across the value chain. Profit allocation has become increasingly important as 
firms seldom produce value on their own, but rather rely on co-innovation and other 
mechanisms to increase their reach and gain access to complementary assets and 
competencies. Value capture is also a key vector of business model innovation. In fact, at 
times, changing markets force firms to innovate in this area of the business model, as in 
newspaper publishing, where the balance between subscriptions and advertising revenues 
is evolving. Innovation may also allow a firm to gain market leadership through cost 
restructuring, as in the case of low-cost airlines. As Apple has demonstrated with its 
30/70 revenue split on iTunes and the App Store, profit allocation can be a very effective 
area for lucrative business model innovation. Of course, Apple’s story also illustrates 
how fleeting such gains can be. When Apple first offered artists and developers 70 
 percent of revenues, that cut was significantly higher than what other online platforms 
offered, and it powered a rapid adoption of the iOS platforms. However, as the revenues 
Apple takes in from app sales have grown, this revenue split has been heavily criticized, 
and Apple’s 30 percent cut is now often referred to as the “Apple tax” (Bradshaw and 
Bond 2015).  
Value communication—how companies communicate with customers and partners 
about their products and the value they create (Bieger and Reinhold 2011; Abdelkafi, 
Makhotin, and Posselt 2013)—is the last key component of an effective business model. 
Value communication comprises both the story the firm tells and the ethos it 
communicates as well as the communication channels used to tell that story. Beyond 
simply describing the products and services they offer, ethos and story enable companies 
to set themselves apart from the competition and encourage customers to build an 
emotional identification with the company. Communication channels are constantly 
evolving, most recently with the increased importance of social media—itself an 
innovation—in communicating a company’s values and offerings.  
These five elements together provide a solid basis for a comprehensive business model 
framework (Figure 1). Unlike other available tools, this framework presents all the value 
aspects related to business models (creation, proposition, delivery, capture, and 
communication), as well as their subcomponents, thereby enabling an exhaustive 
overview of various the levers of business model innovation. This is particularly 
important because disruption sometimes emerges from changes to just one subcomponent 
of the business model. For instance, online platforms for taxi booking have long existed. 
What made Uber disruptive is that it changed value networks so that anyone, and not just 
professional taxi drivers, could respond to a customer’s need.  
---Figure 1 near here--- 
While this framework is, to our knowledge, the first to offer an integrated view of all the 
value-based components of a business models, other tools also provide an integrated view 
of business models, although from different perspectives. This is the case, for instance, 
with Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas, which is stakeholder focused—intended to 
define who does what in a given business model. That focus makes it valuable for 
designing and building business models, as the required actions become intuitively clear. 
However, it does not focus on value explicitly, and therefore leaves out some of the 
elements of value that may be critical levers of business model innovation. For instance, 
changes in governance can be key levers of business model innovation (as demonstrated 
by the success of Starbucks—one of the key aspect of its business model innovation was 
to treat employees like partners and not just labor force), and digitization often implies 
reconfigurations in the value chain that require rethinking profit allocation, but neither of 
these elements are mentioned in the Canvas. Thus, the 360º framework offers an 
important complement to existing tools.  
The focus on value makes the 360º Business Model Framework a robust tool for 
visualizing business model innovation and for distinguishing the role of the various 
elements of a business model in creating and capturing value. Its comprehensiveness 
 allows distinction between very small elements of the business model, so that apparently 
similar business model innovations can be identified and analyzed. Two case studies—
Spotify and Netflix—help illustrate this use.  
Case Study: Spotify vs. Netflix 
Spotify and Netflix, both of which have emerged as media powerhouses in the last 
decade, seem at first glance to have very similar business models. Both offer, for a flat 
monthly fee, unlimited consumption of streamed content (music in the case of Spotify, 
films and television shows in the case of Netflix). Both offer several pricing tiers, and 
both have disrupted well-established market structures. Spotify and Netflix appear so 
similar in fact, that both are generally cited (together or interchangeably) as epitomes of 
the streaming business model (Keating 2012; Anastasia et al. 2014; Mulligan 2015; 
Westbrooks 2015).  
However, analyzing the two business models using the 360º Framework reveals a very 
different picture. Spotify’s business model innovation modified individual subelements of 
value creation (complementary assets), value proposition (the pricing model), value 
delivery (distribution channels), and value capture (the revenue model) to create a service 
that disrupted the market in spite of the existence of successful predecessors (Figure 2). 
Netflix’s business model, on the other hand, modified nearly all of the elements of value 
creation and value proposition, as well as single elements of value delivery (distribution 
channels) and value capture (the revenue model) in creating its DVD-by-mail and later its 
streaming video services (Figure 3). 
---Figure 2 near here--- 
---Figure 3 near here--- 
It is striking how few components of the industry standard business model Spotify 
changed. Although very few consumers had experienced music streaming before Spotify 
launched in 2008, similar services with comparable business models had existed since at 
least the early 2000s (Rayna 2006). The very first such service, Rhapsody, was launched 
in late 2001, followed by a newly legitimized Napster in 2003. Both had the same 
features that Spotify adopted seven years later: a flat monthly fee for unlimited access to 
streamed music, personalized playlists, and tailored recommendation engines. Indeed, at 
the time of Spotify’s launch, Rhapsody’s catalogue was far wider than Spotify’s, powered 
by distribution agreements with all five major music labels. 
But Rhapsody and Spotify’s other forerunners lacked a critical complementary asset: 
ubiquitous consumer access to smartphones and other mobile Internet-enabled devices. 
To take their music on the go, Rhapsody’s customers had to use a specially equipped 
audio player that was compatible with Rhapsody’s digital rights management technology. 
The choice of such players was abysmally small and, of course, did not include the iPod, 
the audio player of choice for 80 percent of consumers at the time (Rayna 2006). When 
Rhapsody reverse-engineered Apple’s DRM system in order to make its music available 
on iPod, Apple reacted by releasing new firmware that blocked Rhapsody music on iPod. 
 Spotify, by contrast, launched at the very moment when that critical complementary asset 
became available. By that time the Apple iPhone and countless Android smartphones 
were available, and both mobile operating systems had become open platforms. Spotify’s 
customers had only to download an app to have access to their music wherever they went. 
Developing apps for iOS and then Android gave Spotify instant access to this new mobile 
distribution channel.  
Spotify’s only other business model innovation was the creation of a free pricing tier that 
offered users the option to listen to advertisements in place of paying subscription fees, 
creating a new revenue model previous entrants had not accessed. However, this element 
was not entirely new; it had been used by television streaming services since the early 
2000s and Last.fm, the Internet streaming radio service, had introduced a similar model 
just months before Spotify’s launch. 
Thus, the novel aspects of Spotify’s business model relate, on the one hand, to 
complementary assets (mobile phones and Internet-enabled mobile devices, as well as 
their operating systems) and distribution channels (mobile Internet networks), and on the 
other hand to pricing models (introduction of a free tier) and revenue models (use of 
advertising to fund the free tier).  
Netflix, which launched in 1997 as a traditional pay-per-rental DVD rental service that 
offered delivery by mail, became truly disruptive only when it innovated the business 
model more thoroughly. In 1999, the company switched to a subscription model, in 
which customers paid a monthly fee for “all you can watch” mail-order DVD rentals. 
This model, which innovated both on distribution channels (mail delivery) and pricing 
model (monthly fees versus per-DVD fixed-period fees plus late fees collected when 
customers failed to return DVDs within the rental period) was highly disruptive, 
displacing the leading video rental chains (most notably Blockbuster). The company’s 
next innovation was the launch of a subscription-based streaming service in early 2007. 
Interestingly, this move was disruptive not only for Netflix’s competitors, but also for the 
company’s own business model—Netflix itself predicted that streaming would eventually 
displace DVD rentals altogether. Netflix was the first company to launch such a service, 
making it an innovator in terms of product offering and service offering, as well as 
pricing model and distribution channel.  
However, Netflix’s business model innovation reaches beyond these pricing and channel 
elements. A critical aspect of the company’s business model relates to its very effective 
recommendation system, which offers suggestions for what users may enjoy based on 
their past consumption.1 While recommendation systems were not intrinsically new— 
nearly all online music vendors had one—Netflix was the first to use one for films and 
television shows. Beyond that, Netflix invested far more than previous companies had in 
developing its recommendation system as an asset, creating a highly powerful data 
mining system that, rather than relying only on a customer’s past consumption to create 
recommendations, would also cross-reference usage patterns across all users to offer 
unique recommendations. The company even launched an open competition in 2006, the 
Netflix Prize, offering a prize of $1 million to anyone who could improve the results of 
the algorithm by more than 10 percent.2 With this recommendation system, Netflix 
 improved both the value proposition (as the recommendation system is a service bundled 
with Netflix’s subscription offer) and value creation—its core competencies (the 
algorithm), key resources (the data collected) and value networks (ratings supplied by 
users). 
The recommendation engine eventually provided the data to power Netflix’s most recent 
business model innovation: the creation of original content to be distributed exclusively 
through the company’s streaming channel. Analytics using data provided by the 
recommendation algorithm ensured the success of this latest venture by enabling the 
company to tailor scenarios and scripts to match the interests and desires of the potential 
audience.  
Netflix’s focus on its recommendation system has enabled the company to develop 
essential core competencies, such as a very fine understanding of consumption patterns 
and success factors for film and television, that the company has put to good use in 
driving further business model innovations, most notably its foray into original content. 
Netflix has also developed key resources, such as the recommendation algorithm itself 
and its vast database of user consumption patterns and user tagging, commenting, and 
review behaviors. In fact, this database constitutes one of the company’s most valued 
assets; even if competitors were to gain access to the algorithm itself (or develop one just 
as accurate), their recommendations would not be as effective because they would not 
have access to the vast pool of data Netflix has collected. Furthermore, Netflix has 
developed innovative ways to expand its value networks, through customer ratings and 
crowdsourcing (primarily in the form of the Netflix Prize). 
Netflix completely redefined the value proposition for the industry, offering unlimited 
access rather than disk-by-disk rentals. The addition of original content represented a new 
product offering, and the recommendation engine is a new service offering for this 
market. The flat “all-you-can-watch” monthly fee was also a significant departure from 
the usual pay-per-view or pay-per-rental structures that prevailed at the time. 
Netflix’s success has also been driven by its access to complementary assets that provide 
alternative distribution channels, such as mobile devices, game consoles, and connected 
TVs. Finally, Netflix has innovated in terms of value capture, by diversifying its revenue 
model. Unlike Spotify (and many others), Netflix has found a new revenue channel that 
does not rely on advertisements—the company generates revenues by selling its most 
successful original content to television broadcasters worldwide (Anastasia et al. 2014). 
Although Spotify and Netflix are generally seen as interchangeable examples of the 
streaming business model, it is striking how much more innovative Netflix’s business 
model is than Spotify’s. Whereas Spotify’s business model innovation mainly relies on 
significant changes to a handful of subcomponents (four overall), Netflix’s ongoing 
business model innovation has entailed changes in many more subcomponents (nine 
overall), leading to two of the five top-level components (value creation and value 
proposition) being completely redefined (Table 1). Thus, the 360º Framework shows that 
Spotify’s business model innovation is fairly incremental (few components changed to a 
 limited extent), while Netflix has innovated more radically, with more components 
changed and to a greater extent.  
---Table 1 near here--- 
As noted in Keeley et al. (2013), businesses that innovate by changing more dimensions 
of their business models tend to be more disruptive in the long run. Our comparison of 
Spotify and Netflix via the 360º Framework supports this assertion. While Spotify was 
undoubtedly disruptive at its launch, maintaining its competitive advantage is likely to 
require further innovation. As a matter of fact, the company has not sustained its early 
success, as competitors, notably Napster and Rhapsody, have rapidly copied its business 
model innovations and new competitors have entered the market. Two recent entrants, 
Apple and Amazon, represent a serious threat to Spotify because, besides their financial 
firepower, both companies have, like Netflix, invested significantly in developing very 
effective recommendation systems that they can deploy rapidly to support their music 
offerings. Indeed, both companies already have tremendous amounts of music-related 
consumer data to work with, Amazon from customer purchase data and Apple through its 
Genius feature, which generates playlists based on consumers’ playing habits, as well as 
from consumers’ purchases, feedback, and ratings.  
Netflix’s position, by contrast appears safer (at least for now), supported by its extensive 
(and continuing) business model innovations. Competitors have entered the market, but 
many of them still rely on the old, advertising-driven television business model. For 
instance, on Hulu, ads interrupt viewing every 20 minutes, even for paying subscribers; 
content is highlighted mainly as a result of editorial and business choices rather than via a 
strong recommendation algorithm. More serious contenders, such as Amazon, which has 
recently begun offering original content in addition to its Prime Video service, may 
present a stiffer challenge, but Netflix’s core competencies, key resources, and value 
networks continue to provide a valuable competitive advantage.  
Netflix’s business model innovation may well become even more disruptive in coming 
years. The company’s recent forays into content production and distribution, the ubiquity 
of mobile networks, and the growing obsolescence of curated content offerings (like the 
line-ups offered by traditional television channels) may well lead to the birth of an 
entirely new industry, led by streaming giants like Amazon and Netflix, that offer 
consumers the content they want when and where they want it. As history has shown, 
Netflix has never been afraid to make dramatic changes to its business model and 
introduce new ones, even when that meant cannibalizing its current offering.  
Conclusion 
Business model innovation has arguably become the critical way to innovate, sometimes 
even trumping technological innovation as a key source of competitive advantage. Yet, 
until now, business model innovation and its success factors have remained poorly 
understood, with the available tools not providing the level of detail and systematic 
understanding required to execute business model innovation. Our 360º Business Model 
Framework offers a detailed view of a business model, with a clear focus on all of the 
value dimensions that make up the foundation of every business model. Further, by 
 highlighting where, exactly, a business model is innovative, the framework can help 
illuminate the long-term competitiveness of the innovation.  
The 360º Framework does have some limits. In particular, while all of the value-based 
components (and subcomponents) of business model innovation are captured by the 
framework, the tool does not allow for components to be weighted for their likely 
disruptiveness. Weighting of particular components is likely to vary from industry to 
industry and from firm to firm—for some markets and firms, value creation innovations 
will be more important; in others, value capture or value proposition innovations will lead 
to more significant competitive advantage. This means, of course, that while the 
framework is useful for identifying possible paths of business model innovation, the 
actual choice of a particular path will require a deeper analysis.   
Understanding business models and business model innovation has become increasingly 
important for companies’ success, and even sometimes for their survival. The 360º 
Business Model Framework provides practitioners with a useful tool for reflecting on and 
implementing business model innovation. 
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 Notes 
1. Very effective, indeed. According to Netflix, 75 percent of viewer activity is driven 
by recommendation (Vanderbilt 2013). 
2. See http://www.netflixprize.com/. The competition ran until 2010, when it was 
discontinued because of privacy concerns. 
  
 Table 1.—Comparison of business model innovation components—Spotify vs. Netflix  
 Spotify Netflix 
Value creation   
Core competencies — Data mining, content production 
Key resources — User data, original content 
Complementary assets Mobile Internet access  
Internet-enabled PCs and 
devices 
Value networks — Users, crowd 
Value proposition   
Product offering — Video streaming, original content 
Service offering — Recommendations 
Pricing model Free tier “All you can watch” 
Value delivery   
Distribution channels Mobile Internet 
Internet, mobile Internet, 
alternate devices (game 
consoles, television)  
Value capture   
Revenue model Advertisement Subscription, content syndication 
 Note: Only components changed by one or both companies are shown. 
  
  
Figure captions 
Figure 1.—360° Business Model Framework 
Figure 2.—Components affected by Spotify’s business model innovation  
Figure 3.—Components affected by Netflix’s business model innovation 
 
 
